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REGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
MATTHEW P. HARRINGTON*
It is black letter law that government must provide compensation
to an owner whose property is taken for public use. This rule is
most prominently found in the Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."1 As with all such rules, however, the basic premise is often
easier stated than applied. Determining precisely when property
has been "taken" by the government has often proven to be
something of a challenge.
Courts and commentators have generally agreed that compensation is due when the government physically takes property from a
private landowner, as for example, when land is taken for the
building of a school or post office. A far more vigorous debate arises,
however, when the government regulates private property in such
a way as to restrict or eliminate the owner's right to use property
in a particular manner. The circumstances under which compensation ought to be payable in these so-called "regulatory takings"
cases have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly comment.
The origin of this debate can be traced to the Supreme Court's
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 which Chief Justice
William Rehnquist once called "the foundation of our 'regulatory
takings' jurisprudence."3 In Mahon, the Supreme Court was
* Visiting Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. B.Th., McGill University;
J.D., Boston University; S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-07 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Mahon "charted a significant new course" and "kindled"
the "so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014 (1992) (noting that Mahon introduced the concept that overregulation of property could
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confronted with the question of whether a Pennsylvania statute
limiting a coal company's right to conduct certain mining operations
resulted in a regulatory taking.4 Writing for the majority, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that a state must have some
power to regulate property in ways that would not implicate the
Compensation Clause.5 The difficulty, he noted, was in determining
the proper boundary between lawful regulations under the state's
police power and regulations that amount to a taking under the
Compensation Clause.' "The general rule," Holmes concluded, "is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."7 Holmes
himself recognized that this particular formulation did not offer
much guidance beyond the statement of a general principle.
Instead, he asserted that precise determinations had to be made on
the facts of each case.8 In Holmes' view, the question of whether a
regulatory taking "goes too far" is really one "of degree-and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. " '
be considered a taking under the Fifth Amendment). A thorough scholarly study of the
Court's Mahon opinion is found in Robert Brauneis, aThe Foundation of Our 'Regulatory
Takings' JurisprudenceS: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
4. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13. The case involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Kohler
Act, a 1921 statute that prohibited a coal company from mining when the activity would
cause damage to the surface of another's land. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice
Holmes: Reassessingthe Significanceof Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813,818 (1998). Mahon's father
purchased the surface rights to the property in question from the Pennsylvania Coal
Company in 1878. Id. The coal company retained both the mineral and the "support rights."
Id. Under Pennsylvania law existing at the time of the sale, a coal company with support
rights had no duty to the surface owner to protect or repair the surface from damage when
its mining operations caused subsidence. Id. The Kohler Act effected a dramatic change in
the law because it essentially stripped the coal company of its ability to mine without
providing support to the owner of the surface rights. Id. When Mahon and her husband
received notice from Pennsylvania Coal that it intended to begin mining operations under
their property, they sought an injinction under the Kohler Act to bar the company from
conducting operations "in such a way as to cause subsidence." Id. Pennsylvania Coal
challenged the constitutionality of the Act, but the state supreme court upheld the statute.
See Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491 (Pa. 1922). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Pennsylvania court's decision and struck down the Kohler Act. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414,416.
5. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 415.
8. Id. at 413.
9. Id. at 415, 416.

2004]

REGULATORY TAKINGS

2055

Justice Holmes' opinion in Mahon has generated an enormous
amount of scholarly comment. Although much of this comment has
been devoted to attempts to place the opinion in Mahon within the
context of Holmes' jurisprudence on the proper deference to be
accorded to legislative decision making, the real significance of
Mahon is that "it has become a virtual surrogate for the original
understanding of the Takings Clause." 10
As this Article will show, the original understanding of the clause
was that compensation for property affected by government action
was due only when the government physically took the property in
question. Compensation was not required where the value of
property had been diminished by government regulation. Mahon
altered this understanding, however. In advancing what was
essentially a diminution in value test, Justice Holmes provided the
basis for an entirely new understanding of the Fifth Amendment's
compensation requirement. As a result, it is Holmes' opinion in
Mahon, rather than the founding generation's original understanding, that has become the primary point of reference for those
seeking to understand the nature and scope of the Compensation
Clause. Mahon has become, in other words, a "touchstone from the
past that can be used to resolve current controversies."" Relying on
Mahon, the Supreme Court has embarked upon an entirely new
form of jurisprudence in which it attempts to test the validity of
state and federal legislation from the vantage point of whether
2
government regulations go "too far."1
Recently, however, a number of scholars have sought to demonstrate that Holmes' opinion in Mahon was not as dramatic a
departure as is often claimed. They argue instead that the regulatory takings doctrine emerged well before the Supreme Court's
opinion in Mahon. Some attempt to show that both state and
federal courts had already recognized a right to compensation for
10. Treanor, supra note 4, at 814.

11. Id. at 815.
12. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (applying the "essential
nexus" test, whereby a state must show a strong connection between its regulation of the
property and the rationale behind its exercise of police power); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992) (looking instead to the magnitude of the effect of regulation on
the economic value of the property); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37
(1987) (creating the "essential nexus" test).
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regulatory takings long before Justice Holmes wrote his now
famous opinion. 3 Other scholars have raised doubts about the
traditional view that the Compensation Clause was designed to
require compensation only in cases of physical takings. 14 They seek
to show that the original understanding of the Compensation
Clause was broad enough to encompass precisely the sort of
regulatory taking that was at issue in Mahon. In the view of these
commentators, Justice Holmes' opinion was not groundbreaking
insofar as it altered the traditional understanding of the clause.1 5
Rather, they argue that in Mahon, Holmes merely gave credence to
a view of the Compensation Clause that was well within the
contemplation of the founding generation at the time the clause was
drafted.
This line of inquiry has produced its own scholarly backlash as
other commentators have attempted to refute what they perceive to
be the creation of a "revisionist" history of the Compensation
Clause. Relying on eighteenth century dictionaries and other
sources, these scholars make a semantic argument, attempting to
show that the words chosen by the drafters of the Fifth Amendment
evidence an intent to limit the requirement of compensation only to
cases of physical expropriation of property. 6 Consequently, they
argue that in drafting the Compensation Clause, the first Congress
intended merely to require compensation for physical expropriations of property. 17
13. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct,
Physical Takings Thesis 'Goes Too Far,"49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999).
14. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that the proper interpretation of the Takings Clause
includes takings by regulation as well as eminent domain); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The
OriginalUnderstandingof the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1630(1988).
15. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14; Kmiec, supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause-"PoorRelation"No More?, 47 OKLA. L.
REV. 417, 420-21 (1994) (arguing that the eighteenth century definition "of the verb to take'"
encompassed only the actual physical "appropriation or acquisition of property"); see also
"Take" in SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1756). But cf. Gold,
supra note 13, at 187-90 (arguing that both direct, physical takings as well as regulatory
takings might be included in the term).
17. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 420. An interesting exception to this type of
examination is found in William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUm. L. REV. 782, 834-55 (1995), in which the
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This Article will attempt to resolve the debate surrounding the
original meaning of the Compensation Clause. It will show that the
Compensation Clause was designed to perform the limited function
of addressing Anti-Federalist fears that a distant and insular
government would expropriate the property of the citizenry without
reasonable compensation. Although it might seem strange to us
today, the fear that a distant national government would confiscate
the property of the people was not an idle one in the early republic.
After all, at this point in their short history, the only experience
Americans had with a central government was that which was
created under the Articles of Confederation. Although this government has often been characterized as weak and impotent,' 8 it did
not hesitate to engage in widespread confiscations to support the
Continental Army during the Revolutionary War.19 The extent of
these confiscations angered many, to the point that even the most
ardent patriots worried about the detrimental effect such takings
had on public confidence.2"
The ratification debate of 1787 to 1788 rekindled these fears as
Anti-Federalists repeatedly warned Americans about the dangers
posed by the extensive powers granted to the national government
in the new Constitution.2 ' As a result, the Compensation Clause
became the means by which supporters of the new government
attempted to neutralize the fears of those who worried that a
powerful central government would engage in widespread expropriations of private property.2 2
This Article will begin by briefly outlining the concerns for the
protection of property rights that formed the basis of efforts to
strengthen the American union during the "critical period" of

author argues that James Madison intended to guard against physical takings because
tangible property was uniquely liable to arbitrary confiscation by governmental bodies
dominated by majoritarian decision making.
18. See, e.g., Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concernfor the Security of PropertyRights
on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIs. L. REV. 1135, 1138
(characterizing the government as "weak and ineffectual").
19. E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC

FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 60-63 (1961).
20. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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American history between 1781 and 1787.23 Part II will examine the
concerns about the extensive powers of the national government
during the course of the ratification debate, and will demonstrate
that the drafting of the Compensation Clause, like that of the rest
of the Bill of Rights, was designed to address Anti-Federalist fears
about the power of a distant and overreaching national government.
This Article will conclude in Part III by showing that the original
understanding of the Compensation Clause did not encompass a
right to compensation for so-called "regulatory takings."
I. PROTECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS

The decade following the outbreak of war between England and
her American colonies was marked by severe economic turmoil.
Traditional trading patterns and relationships were severed or
disrupted; prices of staples and other commodities fluctuated
wildly; and the specie necessary for the payment of debts nearly
evaporated.2 4 Faced with the potential collapse of the economic
system, state legislatures passed a wide range of laws designed to
prop up their economies. These included laws emitting large
amounts of paper currency, tender laws, and debtor protection
statutes. However, as the decade progressed, commercial interests
began to complain about the way in which state legislatures
arbitrarily altered existing legal and economic relationships. In
time, these complaints grew so loud that political elites expressed
concern about the security of property rights. According to James
Madison, attacks on property rights by state legislatures had
become "so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast
2
friends of republicanism." 1
By the latter part of the 1780s, therefore, it seemed clear to many
that some means of limiting the power of state government must be
devised if the nation's economic situation were to be improved. As
a result, in setting about the task of framing a new government, the
23. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIC: 1776-1787, at 393

(1969).
24. Bruchey, supra note 18, at 1137-41.
25. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 270, 276 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1966) (1955).
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Constitutional Convention which met at Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787 was motivated, in part, by a desire to provide
adequate protection for property rights.26 During the course of the
convention, the delegates expended a great deal of energy on
devising the means by which property rights might be protected.
In particular, they sought to prevent state legislatures from passing
laws impairing contract rights and issuing paper money.2 7
Yet while most delegates believed that government was instituted (at least in part) to protect property rights, it should be noted
that the Framers were not absolutists on the issue of protecting
property. On the contrary, they had a more nuanced view of the
protections that ought to be offered property ownership, because
they lived in an age when government exercised an impressive
degree of control over private economic activity. Moreover, many of
those attending the Philadelphia Convention supported a level of
government regulation of economic and property rights that modern
readers would find shocking. Even Blackstone, who saw property
rights as a function of a citizen's "sole and despotic dominion" over
the "things of this world," understood that the citizen's dominion
was limited in ways that would appear to qualify as takings today.28
Eighteenth century government reserved unto itself the power to
regulate almost all aspects of economic activity, and both English
and American governments had a long history of imposing severe
restrictions on trade and commerce, including restricting the use of
land and limiting the right to engage in certain economic activity.2 9
For example, both colonial and confederation governments made
extensive use of the power of eminent domain to take property for
the building of public facilities, such as courthouses or forts.
Frequently, the various legislatures expected that land for such
26. For example, James Madison noted that the "primary objects of civil society are the
security of property and public safety." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 147 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (1911); see also id. at 302 (remarks of Alexander
Hamilton) (The "[o]ne great [object] of [government] is personal protection and the security
of Property.").
27. Michael McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the
RelationshipBetween IndividualLibertiesand ConstitutionalStructure,76 CAL. L. REV. 267,
270-71, 283-85 (1988).
28. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
29. See, e.g., 4 Id. ch. 12 (detailing extensive limitations on trade and commerce).
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purposes was already held in the public domain or available for
purchase on the open market."° When land was unavailable, legisla3
tures routinely expropriated private property to build courthouses, 1
forts, 2 prisons,3 3 lighthouses,3 4 wharves and docks,35 ship yards,36
custom houses, 37 and public warehouses, 38 as well as to relocate
entire communities. 9
30. See, e.g., An Act for Impowering Trustees to purchase a House in the Town of
Savannah for the Use of the present and future Governors of this Province (1760), reprinted
in 18 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 388 (Allen D. Candler ed., AMS

Press, Inc. 1970) (1904); An Act for erecting a new Market-House in the City of Annapolis
(May 15, 1751), microformed on MARYLAND COLONIAL SESSION LAWS, 1692-1774 (William S.
Hein & Co., Inc.).
31. See, e.g., An Act to vest the right of two acres of land, whereof Elizabeth Exum is
seized in fee-simple, in the justices of the County of Southampton, to the use of the said
county (1752), reprintedin 6 THE STATUTESAT LARGE: BEINGA COLLECTION OFALL THE LAWS
OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN 1619, at 283 (William Waller

Hening, ed., Univ. Press of Virginia 1969) (1819) [hereinafter LAWS OF VIRGINIA].
32. See, e.g., An Act to enable the Inhabitants of Schenectady, to fortify the said Town
(1755), microformed on NEW YORKCOLONIAL SESSION LAWS, 1691-1775 (William S. Hein &
Co., Inc.).
33. See, e.g., An Act for Erecting a court-house and public prison for Baltimore county,
in the town of Baltimore, and for making sale of the old court-house and prison (1768),
microformed on MARYLAND COLONIAL SESSION LAWS, 1692-1774 (William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc.).
34. 6 R.I. COLONIAL RECORDS 516 (1763).
35. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Buildings, Streets, Lanes, Wharfs, Docks, and
Alleyes of the Citty of New Yorke (1691), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK
269 (Charles Z. Lincoln et al. eds., 1894).
36. See, e.g., An Act for laying out and erecting a Town at a Place called Long Point on
the West Side of North-East River, in Cecil County (1750), microformed on MARYLAND
COLONIAL SESSION LAWS, 1692-1774 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.).
37. See, e.g., An Act ... for the Building of an Exchange and Custom House, and New
Watch House in Charlestown (1767), reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 257 (Thomas Cooper, ed., Columbia, S.C., A.S. Johnston 1838).
38. See, e.g., An Act for amending the Staple of Tobacco, for preventing Frauds in his
Majesty's Customs, and for the Limitation of Officers Fees (1747), microformedon MARYLAND
COLONIAL SESSION LAWS, 1692-1774 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.); An Act ... for amending
the Staple of Tobacco; and for preventing frauds in his Majesty's Customs (1742), reprinted
in 5 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at 124, 147.
39. The relocation of state capitals required expropriation of large tracts of land. In 1786,
South Carolina authorized the taking of a tract of two square miles so that the state capital
might be moved to Columbus. Act of Mar. 22, 1786, No. 1333, 1786 S.C. Acts 56, 56-58 ("An
Act to appoint Commissioners to purchase Land for the purpose of building a Town, and for
removing the Seat of Government thereto"), reprintedin 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, supra note 37, at 751-53. Virginia took land for government buildings and public
squares when it moved the state capital to Richmond. See Act of May 3, 1779, 1779 Va. Acts
ch. 21 ("An act for the removal of the seat of government"), reprintedin 10 LAWS OFVIRGINIA,
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No doubt the most intriguing facet of eighteenth century takings
law involved the apparent willingness of both colonial and state
governments to appropriate land for economic development
ventures. Indeed, the scope of takings for economic development
between 1620 and 1787 is quite startling, as legislatures frequently
used the power of eminent domain to take land from one private
party and transfer it to another in an effort to achieve some desired
economic object.'0 These regulations generally took two forms. The
first involved affirmative use requirements, which imposed an
obligation upon landowners to take possession and put their land
to immediate economic use or risk the forfeiture of that property. 4'
supra note 31, at 85, 87; Act of May 4, 1780, 1780 Va. Acts ch. 37 ("An act for locating the
publick squares, to enlarge the town of Richmond, and for other purposes"), reprintedin 10
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at 317-18.
40. Colonial practice in this regard shows that much of the Supreme Court's modem
takings jurisprudence is based on a fallacy concerning the true scope of colonial takings. This
is because recent Supreme Court takings law is based largely on the idea that colonial land
use regulations were limited to preventing nuisance uses of land. Under this reading, state
regulations that unnecessarily burden property ownership are suspect. See, e.g., Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-31 (1992). Yet, far from evidencing a laissez-faire
attitude toward property rights, colonial governments regulated almost every aspect of
property ownership, and did not hesitate to restrict certain land uses when necessary to
accomplish a public purpose.
41. For example, a Massachusetts statute of 1634 decreed that "any man that hath any
greate quan[tityl of land graunted him & doeth not builde upon it or im[prove it] within three
yeares, it shalbe free for the Court to disp[ose] of it to whome they please." Ordinance of Apr.
1, 1634, reprinted in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSEETS BAY 114 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleffed., 1853); see also Act of Nov. 15, 1636,
reprinted in 11 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 6, 18 (David Pulsifer ed.,
Heritage Books, Inc. 1999) (1861) (failure to occupy or desert granted lands results in
forfeiture). Similar statutes were enacted in most other colonies, including Plymouth, New
Netherland, New York, Delaware and South Carolina. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 28, 1633,
reprintedin 11 RECORDS OFTHE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 14, supra;Order ofthe Governor
of Oct. 25, 1678, reprintedin RECORDS OF THE COURT OF NEW CASTLE ON DELAWARE, 16761681, at 243-44 (Tribune Publishing Co. 1935) (1904); An Act for the Speedier Seating of
Land (1669), reprintedin 25 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 121 (Walter Clark ed.,
1906); Act of Mar. 22, 1786, No. 1333, 1786 S.C. Acts 56, 56-58 ("An Act to Appoint
Commissioners to purchase Land for the purpose of building a Town, and for removing the
Seat of Government thereto"), reprintedin 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
supra note 37, at 751-53; An Act to Appropriate the Yamosee Lands to the use of such
Persons as shall come into and settle themselves in this Province (1716), reprinted in 2 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 37, at 641, 643; Act of Feb. 17, 1644,
reprintedin 1 LAWS OFVIRGINIA, supranote 31, at 291. Other colonies retook property from
settlers who had earlier seated their lands and subsequently deserted them. After the
Revolution, states continued to use their eminent domain powers to encourage economic
development projects. For example, the Georgia legislature threatened purchasers of lots in
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The second involved aesthetic requirements and were also
common. 42
Yet, despite the extensive nature of colonial and confederation
land use regulations, there generally seems to have been very little
opposition to their enactment. While the imposition of particular
restrictions or their application in individual cases occasionally
sparked controversy, there was simply no widespread movement
to challenge the continuing right of legislatures to regulate all
aspects of land ownership. As a result, when it came to including
protections for property rights in the federal Constitution, the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention devoted most of their
attention to the problem of state interference with contracts, and
specifically contracts for debt.4" Most of the Framers believed debtor
relief laws, tender laws, and paper money schemes presented
substantial obstacles to the development of an extended commercial
republic. Consequently, the final draft of the Constitution contained
Augusta with forfeiture if they did not build houses on them within two years. See Act ofJan.
23, 1780, 1780 Ga. Laws 232 ("An Act for the more speedy and effectual settling and
strengthening this State"), reprinted in 1 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 232
(John D. Cushing ed., 1981). Georgia law also declared that property owners who had
absented themselves from the state would be deemed to have vacated their lands, allowing
the state to retake them for distribution to others. See id. at 235. In 1777, the Virginia
Assembly's committee to revise the laws resolved that lands which had not been improved
were to be "lapsed upon Petition." Plan Agreed upon by the Committee of Revisors at
Fredericksburg (Jan. 13, 1777), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325, 328 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1950). Several other statutes authorized town officials to forfeit land on which no
house had been built even where there was no express condition contained in the original
grant. See Act of Oct. 10, 1785, 1785 Va. Acts ch. 94 ("An act for establishing the town of
Clarksburg in the county of Harrison"), reprintedin 12 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at
208-09; Act of Oct. 3, 1778, 1778 Va. Acts ch. 32 ("An act for establishing the town of
Martinsburg, in the County of Berkeley, and for other purposes"), reprintedin 9 LAws OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at 569-70; Act of Oct. 3, 1778, 1778 Va. Acts ch. 22 ("An Act for
establishing a Town at the Courthouse in the county of Washington"), reprinted in 9 LAWS
OF VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at 555, 557; see also John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic and the OriginalMeaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1128-29
(2000) (discussing land forfeiture).
42. See, e.g., The General Laws and Liberties of Connecticut Colonie, Home Lotts (1672),
microformed on CONNECTICUT COLONIAL SESSION LAWS, 1672-1776 (William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc.) (ordering that houses be "upheld, repaired, maintained sufficiently in a comely way");
An Act for Regulating the Buildings, Streets, Lanes, Wharfs, Docks, and Alleyes of the Citty
of New Yorke (1691), reprintedin 1 THE COLONIALLAWS OFNEW YORK, supra note 35, at 269
(authorizing the city of New York to make rules for the "better regulation,] uniformity[,] and
[gracefulness] of such new buildings as shall be Erected for habitations").
43. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 280-81.
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several specific property protections, among which were Article I's
prohibitions on the passage of paper money laws, tender laws, and
laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts.""' These restrictions
were designed to prevent a recurrence of the worst excesses of the
state legislatures. 5
At the same time, however, there is no evidence that anyone at
the Constitutional Convention made any attempt to limit the power
of state legislatures to impose restrictions on land use. This is
probably because very few of the delegates doubted that the states
had the power to regulate land. In addition there is not a single
reported case in which a colonial or confederation court ever
ordered compensation for a so-called regulatory taking. In fact, the
almost universal agreement concerning the states' power to
regulate physical property means that the concept of a regulatory
taking would have been unknown to most eighteenth century legal
theorists. In the years leading to the Constitutional Convention in
1787, the bulk of concerns about property rights centered on state
interference with rights of contract rather than on land regulation
policies. 6 Given this lack of concern, the Framers' primary focus in
including protections for property in the text of the Constitution
was directed at preventing a repeat of those practices (e.g., paper
money, tender, and debtor relief laws) that generated so much
controversy in the 1780s. 47
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The proposed Constitution was controversial when published.
Opposition to the new frame of government surfaced almost
immediately, resulting in a vigorous debate between those who
argued for ratification, soon to be called "Federalists," and the socalled "Anti-Federalists," who urged rejection. Anti-Federalists
feared that the extensive powers given the national government
under the proposed Constitution would allow it to overwhelm and
44.
45.
46.
(1819).
47.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
See McConnell, supra note 27, at 283-85.
Id. at 280-81; see also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 204-06
McConnell, supra note 27, at 280-81.
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endanger the states.4" More importantly, they seized upon the fact
that the Constitution failed to provide basic protections for
individual liberty, and urged rejection unless a bill of rights was
incorporated in the constitutional text.4 9 After a long and bitter
struggle, the Constitution was ultimately ratified, but only after
Federalists were forced to promise that amendments to the
Constitution would be taken up once the first Congress convened."0
Shortly after the first Congress convened in 1789, James Madison
made good on the Federalist promise to offer amendments to the
Constitution. Madison's proposals included a number of guarantees
for individual liberty, among which were clauses protecting freedom
of speech, the free exercise of religion, and the right to jury trials in
civil and criminal cases.
It is important to note, however, that Madison did not propose a
bill of rights.5 " On the contrary, he put forth a series of amendments
to the text of the Constitution, many of which were limitations on
the powers given to Congress in Article I and to the courts in Article
III.52 In other words, Madison seems not to have viewed his
proposals as comprising a declaration of rights residing in the
people. Instead, he appears to have had a more modest aim in mind:
In proposing concrete limits on Congress' power to act in certain
areas, Madison sought to answer Anti-Federalist fears that the new
national government would subvert the rights of the citizenry.
Proposing to revise Articles I and III allowed Madison to avoid
having to make general statements about the rights of man, the
content and form of which would undoubtedly have generated
enormous debate. Even more significantly, Madison largely
avoided any statement about the legitimate powers of the states
themselves .
48. WOOD, supra note 23, at 516-17 (describing Anti-Federalist opposition to the
Constitution).
49. STANLEY M. ELKINs & ERIC MCKITRIcK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 59 (1993).
50. Id. at 60.
51. A close look at Madison's proposals in Congress reveals that he was actually making
amendments to the various articles of the Constitution, the effect of which would be to
provide protections for individual rights. He did not propose a formal bill of rights asking to
supercede those which were appended to many of the state constitutions. See 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 448-454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
52. Id.
53. An extended discussion of Madison's role and motives in drafting the Fifth
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It is also important to note that Madison himself did not really
believe that amendments to the Constitution were necessary.
Although he may not have been entirely satisfied with the Constitution's current form, Madison clearly believed that any attempt to
make significant alterations so soon after its adoption would have
been premature.5 4 He was also concerned about the continuing calls
for a second constitutional convention, and feared that reopening
the document to revision would be disastrous.55 At the same time,
however, Madison knew that a "great number" of Americans
remained dissatisfied with the Constitution, he was sure that "a
great body of the people" were "inclined to join their support to the
cause of Federalism" if the Constitution were to provide more
definite protections for the liberty of the citizen.56 The Constitution
had, after all, received the approval of a bare majority of the states,
and two states still remained outside the union." Including basic
protections for civil liberties would, in Madison's view, go a long
way toward disarming Anti-Federalist complaints.5 8
Amendment can be found in Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original
Understandingof the So-Called 'Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1278-87 (2002).
54. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORYOF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES

3 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) [hereinafter DHFFC].
55. During the 1789 debates in the House of Representatives, Madison voiced his fears:
I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a re-consideration of the whole
structure of the government, for a re-consideration of the principles and the
substance of the powers given; because I doubt, if such a door was opened, if we
should be very likely to stop at that point which would be safe to the
government itself.
11 DHFCC, supra note 54, at 820.
56. Id. at 819.
57. Id. at 829 (statement of James Jackson) (remarking that Rhode Island and North
Carolina had not joined the Union).
58. Confronting his adversaries directly on this point, Madison stated:
It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding the
ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United
States, in some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there
is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom
are many respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the
jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is
laudable in its motive. There is a great body of the people falling under this
description, who at present feel much inclined to join their support to the cause
of federalism, if they were satisfied in this one point: We ought not to disregard
their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their
wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this
constitution.
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Many in Congress were loathe to take up the subject of amendments, however, arguing instead that more important business was
at hand. By June 1789, the House was already considering several
revenue bills, as well as bills establishing the departments of war,
state, and treasury. Having spent so much time on this work, the
members were not inclined to interrupt it.5 9 Thus, in arguing
against taking up Madison's amendments, South Carolina's William
Loughton Smith asserted that "in point of propriety [the judiciary
bill] deserved the first attention of the house." 0 Smith simply "could
not conceive the necessity of going into any alterations of the
government until the government itself was perfected."6 1 After all,
Smith noted, "[t]he constitution establishes three branches to
constitute a whole; the legislative and executive are now in
existence; but the judicial is uncreated." 2 He therefore warned the
members that remaining in this state meant "not a single part of
the revenue system can operate; no breach of your laws can be
punished; illicit trade cannot be prevented."6 3 In Smith's view,
"greater harm will arise from delaying the establishment of the
judicial system, than can possibly grow from a delay of the other
subject."" Georgia's James Jackson agreed and suggested putting
off the subject of amendments to the Constitution "till we have
some experience of its good or bad qualities." The Constitution,
Jackson said:
is like a vessel just launched, and lying at the wharf; she is untried, you can hardly discover any one of her properties. It is not
known how she will answer her helm, or lay her course; whether
Id. at 819 (statement of James Madison); see also Letter from James Madison to Richard
Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346-47 (Charles F. Hobson &
Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (explaining his belief that
amendments protecting rights were "less necessary in a republic" but arguing that a bill of
rights was necessary to head off calls for a second convention).
59. 11 DHFCC, supra note 54, at 830 (statement of James Jackson) ("There are, Mr.
Speaker, a number of important bills on the table which require dispatch; but I am afraid,
if we enter on this business ...
[clertainly we shall lose much of our valuable time, without
any advantage whatsoever.").
60. Id. at 12-18 (statement of William Loughton Smith).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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she will bear with safety the precious freight to be deposited in
her hold. But, in this state, will the prudent merchant attempt
alterations? Will he employ workmen to tear off the planing and
take asunder the frame? He certainly will not. Let us, gentlemen, fit out our vessel, set up her masts, and expand her sails,
and be guided by the experiment in our alterations.6 5
In the face of such opposition, Madison knew he had to tread
carefully. On the one hand, he was convinced that some amendments were necessary to quiet the clamor for a second convention
and secure Rhode Island and North Carolina's entry into the union.
At the same time, however, he knew that the Federalist majority in
Congress was unwilling to devote too much time to revising a
document most believed had not yet been given a fair trial.
Satisfying both factions meant choosing a list of proposals and
language "limited to points which are important in the eyes of many
and ... objectionable in the eyes of none." 6' He was, after all, keenly
aware that "[n] othing of a controvertible nature [could] be expected
to make its way thro' the caprice & discord of opinions which would
encounter it in [Congress] when 2/3 must concur in each House, &
in the State Legislatures 3/4 of which will be requisite to its final
67
success."
With respect to protections for property rights provisions,
therefore, Madison had to address the relatively widespread belief
that the national government might not adequately protect property
interests. Of particular concern to Anti-Federalists was the fact
that Congress had been given broad powers to regulate economic
activity. As a result, an examination of the history leading up to the
inclusion of the Compensation Clause in the constitutional text
reveals the clause was less about concerns with land use regulation
or confiscation than it was about military impressments. Indeed, it
appears that land use policy was of little concern to the founding
generation, for no one either in or outside the Philadelphia Convention ever raised concerns about the issue. In fact, although the
various state ratifying conventions proposed over two hundred
65. Id. at 805 (statement of James Jackson).
66. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supranote 58, at 219.
67. Id.
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amendments to the constitutional text, none suggested including
any provision dealing with the national legislature's power to
expropriate or regulate land. 68 The failure to include a compensation clause applicable to either the state or national governments
would seem to indicate an expectation that intrusive land use
regulation would continue to be the norm under the new Constitution. After all, the nationalists' desire to use the federal government
to promote economic development required aggressive use of land
development policies, the primary tools of which were traditional
expropriations and extensive land use regulation.6 9 Madison's main
concern, therefore, was finding a way to negate what he clearly
thought were unreasonable fears about an overreaching national
government. Consequently, the Compensation Clause seems to have
been more about foreclosing the possibility that a distant national
government might arbitrarily expropriate property without
compensation, than it was an attempt to impose substantive
requirements on the government's power to regulate land use. In
fact, the Compensation Clause has a very close theoretical connection to the so-called military amendments, which were directed at
preventing a large standing army from subverting the rights of the
people.7 °
Moreover, in urging rejection of the Constitution, Anti-Federal-.
ists repeatedly charged that the new government would have
unlimited power to oppress the citizenry through confiscatory taxes
and standing armies.7 ' Congress, it was said, had the ability to tax
"land, cattle, trades, occupations, etc. in any amount."72 No matter
how oppressive the taxes might be, "the people will have but this
alternative[:1 ... pay the tax, or let their property be taken, for all
68. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 318-338 (1836) (detailing ratifications of the states and proposed
amendments).
69. John F. Hart, Forfeitureof Unimproved Lands in the Early Republic, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 435, 438-39 (1997). On the drive to use the power of government to promote economic
ends, see CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTERESTS: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 150-52 (1990).

70. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (guaranteeing right to bear arms to support militia); U.S.
CONST. amend. III (prohibiting quartering of troops in private homes without owner's
consent).
71. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA To THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-

FEDERALIST 145, 162 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
72. Id.
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resistance will be in vain. The standing army and select militia
would enforce the collection.""3 Anti-Federalists also warned that
the failure of the Constitution to provide forjury trials in civil cases
meant that military or excise officers would have the ability to
abuse the citizenry with impunity because a "lordly court ofjustice"
sitting without a jury would stand "ready to protect the officers of
government against the weak and helpless citizen.""
The danger that large standing armies posed to liberty was a
recurrent theme throughout the Revolutionary and Confederation
periods. The Crown had long relied on the British army to protect
its dominions in North America while at the same time restraining
colonial opposition, and Anti-Federalists repeatedly warned that
the national government would attempt to establish a large
standing army which would then be used to subvert the liberties of
the people.7 5 Moreover, everyone knew that even an army under
tight civilian control would still require substantial material
support. Indeed, one of the ironies of the American Revolution was
that when it came to exercising the power of expropriation, the
Confederation Congress often appeared far more oppressive than
the British Crown had ever been. This is because throughout the
Revolution, Congress' ability to obtain supplies for the troops was
repeatedly compromised. Lacking the power to tax the people
directly, Congress had to rely on requisitions from the states to
support its activities. The states, however, often failed to provide
the needed funds. Part of the problem was that with the outbreak
of hostilities, "[n ] ormal incomes from export and import duties were
cut off, and it was scarcely possible to lay taxes on polls or property
when men were leaving their occupation to join the army."" British
military operations in those states which saw the brunt of the
fighting only "added to the disorder.""
Even when states had adequate revenues, however, they often
attended to their own needs before sending requisitions off to
73. Id.
74. Essay of a Democratic Federalist, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 71, at 58,61. A fuller discussion of the jury trial debate can be found in Matthew
P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV. 145, 18199 (2001).
75. See supra notes 71-74.
76. FERGUSON, supra note 19, at 30.
77. Id.
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Congress. In time, therefore, Congress abandoned the policy of
monetary requisitions and adopted a plan by which states would be
called upon to provide support in actual goods. 7' This new system
allowed the states to meet their obligations to the army without
having to raise cash, for in theory at least, states might collect the
necessary supplies from taxpayers in kind and transfer them to
Congress' control. Even this new system failed, however, because
without money to purchase the requested items, state receipts of
goods in payment of taxes usually had to abide the seasons with the
result that supplies for the army were rarely available in time or in
the desired quantity.79
To meet the needs of maintaining an active fighting force,
Congress eventually authorized officers of the armed forces to
impress supplies from the surrounding populace.80 For example, in
September 1777, Congress authorized General Washington "to take,
wherever he may be, all such provisions and other articles as may
be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of the army under his
command, paying or giving certificates for the same."8 1 Such
impressments caused a great deal of friction, particularly in the
middle states, which bore the brunt of the confiscations as they had
seen the largest part of the fighting. Apparently, Washington
sensed the hostility to the national government that impressments
caused and refrained from exercising his power to expropriate
property except in the most urgent circumstances. Congress
responded with a thinly veiled rebuke, chiding Washington for his
"forbearance in exercising the powers vested in him."82 In a
December 1777 resolution, Congress worried aloud about Washington's "delicacy in exerting military authority on the citizens of these
states" and cautioned that such a delicacy "though highly laudable
in general, may, on critical exigencies, prove destructive to the
78. Id.; see also 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 1311, 1371,
1377 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1909) (requesting specific supplies of corn and flour).
79. FERGUSON, supra note 19, at 50.
80. One of the earliest of these authorizations was made in November 1775, when
Congress directed the Commissary General "to cause cattle and hogs to be driven at proper
seasons to the Camp, there to be [slaughtered and] cured; and as to the articles of bread and
flour, that he proceed in the way [that] he has done for some time past." 3 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 78, at 323.
81. 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 78, at 752.

82. Id. at 1013, 1014.
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army and prejudicial to the general liberties of America."83
Washington was, therefore, instructed to "endeavour as much as
possible to subsist his army from such parts of the country as
are in his vicinity," taking provisions from all persons without
distinction, leaving only such quantities as should be necessary
for the support of their families.8 4 As a result, beginning in 1779,
"military operations in the field were supported almost entirely
by impressments." 5 Goods taken in this manner were paid for
with "certificates," which were essentially drafts on the national
government.8 6 As a result, wherever the army moved, it left a trail
of paper in its wake. The local populace saw its barns and fields
emptied in exchange for certificates issued by the quartermaster or
commissary. Congress was without the money necessary to redeem
the certificates, however, and so they became largely worthless, at
least in the short term.87
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. FERGUSON, supra note 19, at 59.
86. 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 78, at 751-52 (pledging the

"public faith" for the payment of provisions taken and for which certificates were given).
87. FERGUSON, supra note 19, at 60. Although states frequently complained about the
effects of impressment, military exigencies eventually forced them to become willing
participants. Unable to provide monetary aid to the national government, states in which
military operations were ongoing used the power of impressment in aggressive ways. In
March 1779, the New York legislature authorized the governor to appoint agents to purchase
or seize any flour in the state and hand it over to Continental agents. Act of Oct. 31, 1778,
ch. 5, 1778 N.Y. Laws 92 ("An Act more effectually to provide supplies of flour, meal and
wheat to the army."). The following year, it enacted a law directing assessors to inquire how
much wheat was held by the citizenry. Amounts in excess ofthat required to support a family
were to be confiscated. Act of Oct. 1, 1779, ch. 4, 1779 N.Y. Laws 148 ("An Act to revive and
amend an act entitled 'An act to amend an act for regulating impresses of forage and
carriages and billeting troops within this State' and other purposes therein mentioned."). In
1780, Pennsylvania authorized county officials to seize provisions required by Congress. Act
of May 10, 1780, ch. 178, 1780 Pa. Laws 381 ("An Act for procuring an immediate supply of
Provisions for the Federal Army, in its present Exigency."). It later declared all sheep, cattle,
and salted provisions in the commonwealth subject to impressment. Act of Sept. 4, 1781, ch.
215, 1781 Pa. Laws 481 ("An Act to make more Effectual Provision for the Defence of this
State."). When the war moved to Virginia, that state's legislature authorized the governor
to appoint commissioners to expropriate supplies for the army as needed. See, e.g., Act of
May 4, 1780, 1780 Va. Acts ch. 8 ("An Act for procuring a supply of provisions and other
necessaries for the use of the army."), reprinted in 10 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at
283; Act of Oct. 3, 1778, 1778 Va.Acts ch. 43 ("An Act to enable the Governour and Council
to supply the armies and navies of the United States, and of their allies, with grain and
flour"), reprintedin 9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 31, at 584.
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Throughout the war years, then, Congress routinely resorted to
impressments as a means of supporting the army in the field. The
volume and extent of impressments was staggering, with everything from food, wagons,8" ships, 9 and even people9" being forcibly
appropriated to military use. The extent of these impressments
became a frequent source of complaint. For example, in 1779,
Pennsylvania's supreme executive council complained to Congress
that several Philadelphia men had been impressed into service
aboard the Continental frigate Confederacy, leaving their families
"in a distressed situation."9 Congress was forced to order the
captain of the ship to free the men. Virginia teamsters coerced into
driving wagons for the army either committed sabotage or deserted,
while Pennsylvania "farmers refused to plant crops in excess of
their own needs because the surplus was confiscated."9 2 Often,
supplies had to be obtained at the point of a bayonet. In 1780,
Virginia governor Benjamin Harris wrote to Robert Morris, the
superintendent of finance, and complained that both the American
and British armies "lived on free quarter, & ravaged the Country
from one end of it to the other."9"
Confiscations were so frequent and so extensive that even the
most ardent patriot eventually despaired of receiving any justice.
In 1778, writing under the pseudonym, "A Freeholder," John Jay
complained about "the Practice of impressing Horses, Teems, and
Carriages by the military, without the Intervention of a civil
Magistrate, and without any Authority from the Law of the Land."9 4
88. See 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 78, at 323
(recommending that the New England states pass laws empowering General Washington"to
impress carriages, vessels, horses, and other things necessary at a reasonable rate, for the
transportation or march of the army").
89. For example, in November 1776, Congress directed General Schuyler "to take such
steps as are necessary, for procuring a sufficient number of as large vessels as the navigation
of the lakes will admit of, for the service of the states the next campaign, that the command
of the lakes may be effectually secured." 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra
note 78, at 862.
90. 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 78, at 1204.
91. Id.
92. FERGUSON, supra note 19, at 64.
93. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to Robert Morris (Mar. 20, 1782) (on file with the
author).
94. A Freeholder (John Jay), A Hint to the Legislatureof the State of New York (1778),
in 1 JOHN JAY: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY 461-62 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1975).
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Comparing the Continental quartermasters to petty tyrants, Jay
insisted that expropriations of property be done under colour of law:
It is the undoubted Right and unalienable Priviledge of a
Freeman not to be divested, or interrupted in the innocent use,
of Life Liberty or Property, but by Laws to which he has
assented, either personally or by his Representatives. This is the
Corner Stone of every free Constitution, and to defend it from
the Iron Hand of the Tyrant of Britain, all America is now in
arms; every Man in America being most deeply interested in its
Preservation. Violations of this inestimable Right, by the King
of Great Britain, or by an American Quarter Master; are of the
same Nature, equally partaking of Injustice; and differing only
in the Degree and Continuance of the Injury."
On the face of it, at least, property owners did receive some
compensation when their goods were taken. The reality, however,
was that dramatic depreciations in paper currency meant that the
certificates, which were redeemable in Continental currency, were
largely worthless. Compensation became, then, an illusion.
As a result, by 1789, the traditional fear of large standing armies,
along with the Revolutionary experience with impressment, gave
rise to concerns about the power of the new national government to
requisition supplies without payment. These fears no doubt led
Madison to include provisions in his proposed amendments
prohibiting the quartering of troops among the populace.9 6 The
Compensation Clause added to these protections by preventing the
government from taking property to support its troops without
payment for goods or services received. St. George Tucker expressed
95. Id.; see also Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357,358-59 (1788) (summarizing
the plaintiffs argument)
[A]s between a state and its own citizens, the principle, with respect to the
rights of property, is immutably the same, in war as well as peace. Sometimes,
indeed, the welfare of the public may be allowed to interfere with the immediate
possessions of an individual .... Yet, even then, justice requires, and the law
declares, that an adequate compensation should be made for the wrong that is
done. For, the burthen of the war ought to be equally borne by all who are
interested in it, and not fall disproportionately heavy upon a few.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.").

2074

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2053

this view some years later, noting that the Compensation Clause
"was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive
mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by
impressment, as was too frequently practised during the revolutionary war, without any compensation whatever."9 7 Thus, while
citizens in the several states may not have had a very strong fear
that their lands might be taken for public facilities, their experience
during the war may have led a good many to worry about the
federal government's ability to requisition supplies for a large
standing army.
Madison's Compensation Clause should, therefore, be seen as an
attempt to assuage Anti-Federalist fears that a distant and
"aristocratical" national government would attempt to subvert longheld property interests. At the same time, however, continuing
opposition in Congress to taking up amendments while other
business went unfinished left Madison with a very small window of
opportunity in which to obtain a hearing for his proposals. It is not
surprising, therefore, that in choosing his amendments, Madison
attempted to draw on those proposals most likely to gain the
support of majorities of both Houses of Congress. As a result, it
appears that in drafting the Compensation Clause, Madison
borrowed heavily from Article II of the Northwest Ordinance.9 This
Article contained a due process clause followed immediately by a
compensation clause. Madison's proposal for what was to become
the Fifth Amendment was strikingly similar to this formulation. It
provided procedural protections for criminal cases and then
concluded with a due process and compensation clause in language
almost identical to that of the Northwest Ordinance:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself: nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

97. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OFTHE UNITED STATES; AND

OF THE COMMONWEALTH OFVIRGINIA 305-06 (St. George Tucker ed., The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 1996) (1803).
98. Id.
99. Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
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nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation." °
The similarities between Madison's proposed amendment and the
Northwest Ordinance should not be all that surprising. Given
Madison's desire for quick passage of amendments, it was natural
for him to rely on language that had already gained wide acceptance. In this case, this meant relying on a provision of the Northwest Ordinance, which had passed the former Congress with only
a single "nay" vote.
To some, however, Madison's Compensation Clause seems
somewhat out of place. It is, after all, placed at the end of a rather
long paragraph dealing with criminal procedure and thus has the
appearance of being an afterthought. Consequently, over the years
scholars have had difficulty trying to explain why Madison included
the Compensation Clause in his proposed amendment. Some have
argued that, while expressing an important value, the Clause was
something of an afterthought and did not quite fit in with any other
amendment. According to this reasoning, the Compensation Clause
is the proverbial "kitchen sink" thrown in with other provisions for
good measure.
A more novel explanation comes from Professor Akhil Amar, who
argues that Madison was ahead of his time in urging support for
property rights.'°' According to Amar, Madison recognized that the
greatest danger to property rights came from "a possibly overweening majority rather than from self-interested government agents."0 2
Unfortunately, however, Madison was "unsuccessful in bringing the
needed majorities in Congress around to his way of thinking."0 3
Unable to obtain more explicit protections for the rights of property,
Madison was forced to try to "slip the takings clause through."' 4 In
Amar's view, Madison was thus forced to resort to "clever bundling"
105
to secure passage of the Compensation Clause.
100. 4 DHFCC, supra note 54, at 10 (outlining the text of Madison's proposed resolution).
101. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 77 (1998). Another commentator takes a
similar line, arguing that the "ideology underlying the [takings] clause ran counter to the
republicanism espoused by the Anti-Federalists." Treanor, supra note 17, at 708.
102. AMAR, supra note 101, at 77.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 78.
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This explanation seems implausible, however. First, it is clear
that both Houses of Congress paid rather close attention to
Madison's proposals, and did not hesitate to make alterations,
additions, or deletions where it suited their purposes. As a result,
the idea that vast numbers of congressmen were "asleep at the
switch" so as to allow Madison to slip the Compensation Clause
through is fantastical in the extreme.' 0 6 Second, and undoubtedly
more important, the argument that the Compensation Clause was
a novel development is simply without foundation. There is, in fact,
very little evidence that anyone in the founding generation thought
that government had the power to expropriate property for public
use without compensation. On the contrary, compensation for
government takings was a well-established
feature of American law
10 7
settlement.
of
days
earliest
from the
Why, then, did Madison place the Compensation Clause where he
did? The answer lies in the fact that the Fifth Amendment speaks
to much more than criminal procedure. It is about the rights
106. Id. at 77.
107. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 1276-77. Until the mid-1960s scholars assumed
that Americans were always committed to the principle that government should not take
private property without compensating its owner. See also William W. Fisher, III, Ideology,
Religion, and the ConstitutionalProtectionof PrivateProperty:1760-1860,39 EMORYL.J. 65,
95 (1990). Professors Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood led other commentators to doubt that
hypothesis, however. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OFTHE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 83 (1967); WOOD, supra note 23, at 404. Adherents to the "republican revival"
argued that at the latter part of the eighteenth century, a sizeable segment of the population
was committed only very weakly, if at all, to the idea ofjust compensation. Fisher, supra,at
95. In this view, the Fifth Amendment's Compensation Clause was not a natural outgrowth
of the revolutionary experience; rather, it was a means by which Americans became
reconciled to an idea which had only minimal adherence. Id.; see also MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 63-66 (1977); Morton Horwitz, History and Theory, 96
YALE L.J. 1825, 1833 (1987); Treanor, supra note 17, at 714-16.
In recent years, the scholarly consensus has shifted again. Further research into the
question of compensation has shown that a large majority of Americans were committed to
the principle ofjust compensation from a very early date. See Fisher, supra,at 107. Indeed,
no matter their ideological orientation-and there were many-Americans of all political
outlooks adhered to the idea that takings of property for public purposes required the
payment of compensation. Id. Different groups placed varying emphasis on the extent to
which property ought to be subject to the demands of the state, but there was "virtually
universal agreement on the main point: the state ought not to be able to confiscate a man's
property without his consent." Id. at 99. In fact, "[elven during those moments in the
Revolutionary struggle and its immediate aftermath when social radicals seemed to be in the
ascendence, proposals contemplating compulsory redistribution of property were remarkably
rare." Id.
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applicable when government seeks to deprive a person of liberty
or property.10 8 The Double Jeopardy, Self-Incrimination, and Due
Process clauses certainly provide procedural protections against
prosecutorial abuse in the trial process.'0 9 But, the Due Process
Clause also ensures that deprivations of life, liberty, and property
are undertaken in accordance with established law." 0 In the context
of property, this means that forfeitures are pursuant to the terms
of the applicable criminal or civil statutes."' In the context of
expropriation or taxation, the Compensation Clause means that
exactions of property for public use are obtained in a manner
consistent with the principle of consent. 112 That is to say, it ensures
that exactions of property are made pursuant to statute and not by
executive fiat." 3
Thus, in putting forth his version of the Compensation Clause,
Madison sought to supplement the institutional protections
already afforded property in the Constitution. His experience as a
member of the Virginia legislature during the Confederation period
convinced Madison that protections for property rights were
necessary if the new nation was to develop a stable legal and
economic regime."' No doubt Madison hoped that these protections
might be provided by the structure of republican institutions."1' Yet,
when the call for amendments became too great to resist, Madison
used the occasion to ensure that property protections found their
way into the final list of amendments.

108. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 54 (1998).
109. See id.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111. Ely, supra note 108, at 54.
112. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 1247.
113. Id.
114. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18,1786), in LETTERSAND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 226-27 (1865), in which Madison stated:
Another unhappy effect of a continuance of the present anarchy of commerce
will be a continuance of the unfavorable balance on it, which, by draining us of
our metals, furnishes pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money,
for indulgences to debtors, for postponement of taxes. In fact, most of our
political evils may be traced to commercial ones....
115. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (arguing that the people would "no
doubt, (bel the primary control on the government").
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Moreover, it also appears that Madison intended the Compensation Clause to have a very narrow reach. 11 Itwas designed to limit
the powers of the federal government and to affect only physical
takings of property." 7 This was in keeping with the majoritarian
aspects of Madison's bill of rights, in that Madison was apparently
responding to concerns about overreaching by the national government." 8 That Madison himself intended a narrow reading seems
evident when one considers that the language of his original
proposal only required compensation
when a person was "obliged to
9
property.""
his
relinquish
The choice of terminology seems to indicate that Madison sought
only to deal with takings of actual property rather than what are
now called "regulatory takings" or takings through excessive
taxation.'20 Although both the House and Senate altered Madison's
original language, there is nothing in the debates to suggest that
the changes were intended to broaden the reach of the amendment.
Rather, it seems that the changes were made for stylistic reasons.
A year after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Madison himself noted
that the effect of the Fifth Amendment was to commit the federal
government to the principle that no property, "a man's land, or
merchandize" could be taken "directly even for public use without
indemnification to the owner." 2 '
116. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 708.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 713-14.
119. 4 DHFCC, supra note 54, at 10.
120. Several commentators have argued that the "disproportionate impact" principle
incorporated in the Takings Clause might be utilized to determine the constitutionality of
both taxation and regulation. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and
Confiscation,20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433, 437-38 (1982); see also FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL.,
THE TAKING ISSUE 236 (1973); Richard Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine:The Eminent
Domain Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 351, 360 (1983).
121. James Madison,Property,NAT'LGAZE'rE, Mar. 27,1792,reprintedin14THEPAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 58, at 266, 267.
In the years immediately following ratification of the Bill of Rights, courts repeatedly
asserted that the Compensation Clause was intended to apply only to direct, physical takings
by the national government. In 1832, in Barron v.Baltimore, the Supreme Court held that
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to takings by state governments. 32 U.S. 243,250 (1833).
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Marshall noted that while the case was one "of great
importance," he did not think the question presented was "of much difficulty." Id. at 246.
Prior to Barron, several state supreme courts took up the issue and all asserted that the
Compensation Clause applied only to physical takings by the federal government. See Enfield
Toll Bridge Co. v. Conn. River Co., 7 Day 28, 52 (Conn. 1828) (Dagget, J., concurring)
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III. THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Compensation Clause, like the other provisions .ofthe Bill of
Rights, was drafted in response to Anti-Federalist fears about the
extensive powers of the national government. It was designed to
prevent a distant and potentially self-interested national government from using its powers to take the citizens' property to pursue
its own ends. 122 The fact that no one at the Philadelphia Convention
ever suggested the necessity of a compensation clause applicable to
23
either the states or the national government illustrates this point.1
Moreover, although they had proposed over two hundred amendments, none of the state ratifying conventions demanded
that such
12 4
a clause be inserted into the text of the Constitution.
It is also important to note that the Compensation Clause was
not about land use regulation or confiscation-at least at the
outset. There was, after all, little evidence that anyone thought
the government had thus far abused its power to confiscate private
land. Neither the Revolutionary nor Confederation experience
created any particular concern about the power of eminent
domain. 2 ' Indeed, not even royal officials were accused of overstepping their bounds in this regard. As one modern commentator
put it, "[Wihile the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways,
they never abused eminent domain. They surely would have been
accused of it if they had."126 It is also clear that the founding
generation understood that the state governments had extensive
(suggesting that the Compensation Clause applied only to physical takings of property);
Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. 97, 145 (La. 1816) (holding that the Takings Clause applied only

to the federal government); Gardner v. Trs. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y. Ch.
1816) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states).
122. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 1297.
123. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 282-83.
124. See, e.g., Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and
Policy, 11 ENVrL. L. 1, 17 (1980) ("[Elminent domain was not high among the concerns of
those debating the Bill of Rights."); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 594 (1997) ("[Wlhile there was a popular groundswell for a
bill of rights, we must frankly conclude that there is no evidence that eminent domain
limitations were given much attention.").
125. See Stoebuck, supra note 124, at 594.
126. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Meidinger, supra note 124, at 17 ("Eminent domain
was one prerogative the British had not been charged with abusing in the New World.").
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powers to impose all manner of regulations on the use and disposition of private property. 127 This included the imposition of affirmative use requirements, zoning rules, and restrictions on noxious
uses and aesthetic regulations. Indeed, it appears that the states'
extensive power to regulate private property was one of the least
controversial aspects of the eighteenth century American legal
regime. 2 Thus, while there might be an occasional debate about
the necessity or effectiveness of a particular regulatory scheme, few
went so far as to argue as a general matter that the states lacked
the power to proscribe the ways in which an owner made use of his
land. In short, the power to regulate land, like the power to take
property for a public use, was considered inherent in the nature of
government itself.
As a result, when it came to limiting the powers of the states, no
one at the Philadelphia Convention proposed tampering with the
states' power to regulate land. On the contrary, the delegates'
greatest fear was that the states would devalue property holdings
by emissions of paper money or debtor relief laws. 129 Consequently,
they focused their efforts on ensuring that the constitutional
text included provisions prohibiting the states from emitting
paper money, passing tender laws, or impairing the obligation of
30
contract.
It is only during the ratification process that the debate began to
shift. That a strong central government would use its powers to
abuse the citizenry became an article of faith among the AntiFederalist opposition. More specifically, the fear that a distant and
"aristocratical" government would take private property to support
a standing army or some other public purpose meant that some

127. See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
129. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 280-81 (stating that "many states had passed laws
to relieve private debtors including ... laws requiring creditors to accept paper money... were
the specific evils that inspired the contract clause").
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make

any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ...."); see also Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit,and
FederalistPoliticalEconomy, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION

AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 128, 156 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987)
(discussing Federalist fears of paper money and debtor relief schemes).
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protection against arbitrary takings became desirable.' For his
part, James Madison worried that the national government might
become too responsive to democratic factions in spite of the
institutional protections included in the constitutional text. He thus
sought to include a compensation provision to ensure that a future
landless majority would not easily deprive the propertied minority
of its rights without payment.
In the final analysis, therefore, few expected the national
government to engage in extensive physical takings of property
because the national government was created to serve very limited
ends.'3 2 It also appears that almost no one expected that the
national government would take upon itself the power to impose the
same sort of regulatory restrictions on land use which the states
had long been accustomed to exercising. After all, in urging
ratification, Federalists repeatedly asserted that the government
created under the new Constitution was one of enumerated powers.
The national government would, it was said, operate at the level of
interstate and international relations, limiting its sphere of activity
exclusively to those places where the states had thus far been
unsuccessful in achieving coordinated action. If the Federalists are
to be taken at their word, there was no expectation that the
national government would have the power to impose land use
restrictions because such regulatory schemes were decidedly
intrastate in nature. While many Anti-Federalists harbored
suspicions about the consolidating tendencies of the new Constitution, they too would have rejected any idea that the national
government would legitimately have the power to regulate land use
within the states. For both Anti-Federalists and Federalists,
therefore, it seems clear that almost no one believed the federal
government would have the power to regulate land use and thereby
engage in any sort of regulatory taking.

131. See AMAR, supra note 101, at 79.
132. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 708-09 ("Regardless of political belief, few initially felt
that a just compensation requirement was a necessary restraint on a federal government
that would have little occasion to take property...."). In fact, the federal government seems
not to have exerted the power to take land on its own until 1875. Until then, it relied on the
states to condemn land and transfer title. See Stoebuck, supra note 124, at 559 n.18; see also
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875) (holding that federal government had
eminent domain powers).
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It seems logical to assume, then, that in drafting and ratifying a
Compensation Clause, the founding generation did not expect the
clause to apply to so-called regulatory takings simply because no
one believed that the national government would ever possess the
power to engage in land use regulation. Indeed, to even assert that
the Compensation Clause encompassed regulatory takings would
have raised concerns that the national government's sphere of
action was far more extensive than previously advertised. In such
a case, one would have expected a far more vigorous debate over
governmental power than actually took place. The Compensation
Clause was relatively uncontroversial precisely because it was
designed to clarify one small aspect of the powers of an otherwise
very limited government.

